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1.  Introduction 
Many problems in contemporary social science lend themselves to an analysis in which the individuals 
under study are placed in their context, especially a context that can be defined spatially, as street, block, 
town, county, or some other spatial unit. Data producers have found two ways of providing this 
information, either identifying the spatial unit (so that the data user can link the appropriate contextual 
data herself), or merging the contextual data, effectively adding the characteristics of the spatial unit in 
which the subject lives. In this second case, the record for a given individual includes that person’s 
characteristics (e.g., age of respondent) as well as those where they live (e.g., proportion of population in 
respondent’s neighborhood that is poor). 
 
One reason for providing the contextual data themselves, rather than the identity of the spatial unit, is that 
doing so makes it more difficult to identify the spatial unit in which the survey respondent lives (Armstrong, 
Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999). However, it is possible that the contextual data themselves constitute 
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enough information to be a geographical unique.  If that’s the case – for example if the combination of 
contextual information about a given spatial unit is rare among spatial units of that type – then 
identification is more likely, rather than less (Saalfeld, et. al, 1992).  Care must then be taken to modify 
these data to maintain their confidentiality and their statistical properties, while at the same time ensuring 
that the data have the maximum analytic value for the broadest user group. 
 
Two recent studies followed this practice of adding contextual data to their analytical files.  In producing 
their public-use files for their Residential Energy Consumption Survey, the Energy Information 
Administration perturbed temperature data to mask the location of weather stations (Subcommittee on 
Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005;http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/recs2001/codebook82001.txt). 
And in a study of discrepancies between official votes and exit polls in the 2004 presidential election, 
official tallies of the proportion of Kerry votes were blurred for a sample of Ohio precincts; thereby 
concealing the identity of these controversial voter locations (Kyle et al 2007).  Although they address 
confidentiality issues stemming from contextual data, these studies do not detail the likelihood of 
reidentifying these locations and associated determinants. 
 
In earlier work (Witkowski 2007), I have conducted reidentification experiments to assess how easy it is to 
pinpoint locations within the total population of counties, tracts, and blockgroups, when only aggregate 
information is available.  That work provides estimates of the amount of identification risk associated with 
the spatial scale of contextual measures; the identification of division, state, and MSA-status; and the 
number and coarseness of contextual variables provided in a dataset.  This earlier work is limited to the 
risk of identifying geographic units.  In other words, if we know the percent minority and the percent 
employed in the civilian labor market (or other characteristics); can we know which county we’re talking 
about?  
 
Knowing the county (or census tract, or blockgroup) doesn’t mean that we can identify individuals. It’s just 
the starting point. The next question is to ask about the implications of disclosure risk of geographic units 
for survey respondents.  How does the amount of risk associated with contextual design elements change 
when we consider the dispersion of people across space?  To answer these questions, we must then 
consider reidentification mechanisms that translate risk from geographic units to individuals. 
 
Because microdata files typically consist of both individual and contextual measures, a full assessment of 
risk requires a nested approach to its disclosure analyses that incorporates identifying characteristics of 
both survey respondents and their locations.  This study helps lay the groundwork for such an evaluation 
by:  (1) constructing a hierarchical matching algorithm; (2) discussing methodological concerns that arise 
from this type of assessment; and (3) providing estimates for three key components of locational risk 
derived from persons nested within geographic contexts.  
 
With an analytical approach bridging two levels, my current study informs the design of public-use 
datafiles composed of person-records containing contextual measures at three spatial scales: (1) census 
blockgroups, (2) census tracts, and (3) counties.  Compiling nearly 15,000 test datafiles, I assess three 
determinants of “locational” risk associated with contextualized microdata, that of: (1) identifying survey 
respondents whose contextual characteristics are rarely found among the total population of geographic 
units (i.e., contextual population uniques); (2) identifying survey respondents whose contextual 
characteristics are rarely found within a survey (i.e., contextual sample uniques); and (3) identifying 
survey respondents whose unique contextual characteristics pose no disclosure risk given the protection 
offered by their location’s dense population.   
 
In doing so, I provide estimates for these risk components and illustrate how they vary across the spatial 
scale of contextual information while controlling for other pertinent design elements, such as: (1) the 
identification of division, state, and MSA-status; and (2) the number and coarseness of contextual 
variables provided in a dataset.  Using the “datafile” as my unit of analysis, the proportion of survey 
respondents whose locations are easily-reidentified as the outcome of interest, and indicators of different 
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components of this risk, I detail the complexity of reidentification patterns that emerge when constructing 
public-use files that provide contextual data. 
2.  Empirical Approach to Disclosure Analyses of Contextual Data 
In this section, I outline the analytical steps involved in evaluating disclosure risk for contextual data 
(Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999; De Waal and Willenborg 1995, 1996; Interagency 
Confidentiality and Data Access Group 1999; Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005; 
United States General Accounting Office 2001; Zayatz 2005). 
 
Widely-available summary files of census data identify all counties, tracts, and blockgroups in the United 
States and provide measures describing the characteristics of the population located within these 
geographies.  Trying to safely meet user demands for geographically-rich information, a producer can 
attach these contextual data to their survey respondents’ locations, without directly identifying the 
geography.  But before these microdata files can be released publicly, the producer must assess the 
likelihood that a survey respondent’s location can be correctly reidentified by an intruder using this 
contextual data.   
 
An intruder may identify geographies by conducting an experiment that matches contextual information 
provided in the survey’s public-use file with data available from the original tabulation files for the full 
population of geographies.  Searching within the survey file, the intruder identifies sampled locations that 
share a specific set of contextual characteristics.  Using the same contextual indicators, the intruder then 
identifies locations in the population file that have the same characteristics and compiles identifying 
information (i.e., county name, tract, and blockgroup identifiers) for these “population matches”.   
 
A sampled location having a single match, defined as a “unique”, is unequivocally reidentified when the 
external database represents the full population.  A location with a small number of matches, defined as a 
“rarity”, also faces a significant risk of being reidentified.  Conversely, a location is said to be adequately 
obscured only when there is a sufficiently large number of population matches.  In turn, the producer must 
decide upon a match-threshold that defines the upper bound of risk.  If the number of matches falls below 
this threshold, then risk of reidentification is considered intolerable and therefore the contextual data is not 
safe for release.  The producer considers information sensitivity and intruder behavior when defining this 
match-threshold, incorporating statistical inference arguments to justify their selection.  After defining what 
constitutes anonymity for geographic units, the producer then assesses the amount of risk associated with 
a public-use file’s contextual information by calculating the proportion of locations that are easily 
reidentified. 
 
Using this measure to gauge changes in risk, the producer can then modify the composition of their 
public-use file to meet their goal of maximizing the utility of contextual data while minimizing the chances 
that geographic units are reidentified.  Data utility, as well as the ability to reidentify locations, is enhanced 
by releasing geographic identifiers and a large number of contextual variables.  To effectively design their 
public-use dataset, the producer needs to set priorities regarding (1) the release of geographic identifiers, 
(2) the scope of geographic identifiers, (3) the scale of contextual variables, and (4) the number of 
contextual variables.  The producer can then better select disclosure limitations methods (DLMs) that 
offset the risk associated with these contextual data.   
 
To reduce disclosure risk in public-use microdata files, agencies often only apply nonperturbative methods 
in order to maintain the statistical properties of the original data, thus maximizing its utility for widely 
disparate and largely unknown applications (Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005; 
Zayatz 2005).  Consequently “global recoding” and “local suppression” are important techniques to be 
considered for statistical disclosure control (De Waal and Willenborg 1995, 1996).  Aggregating 
continuous measures into various levels of coarseness decreases the likelihood that locations are 
reidentified (i.e., global recoding).  But for geographic units that are still easily pinpointed, their contextual 
characteristics are not to be released on a microdata file (i.e., local suppression); where the proportion of 
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sampled locations with suppressed contextual data is represented by the aggregate measure of 
disclosure risk.  Because fewer measurement categories and high suppression rates heighten the amount 
of information-loss, a producer needs to consider how data utility varies with these methods.   
 
After assessing the likelihood of pinpointing locations among geographic-unit populations, the producer 
needs to assess how this “locational” risk transfers to their survey’s respondents.  Respondent identity is 
believed to be protected when there are an adequate number of persons – in the survey – sharing the 
same contextual characteristics (i.e., sample unique; k-anonymity; Sweeney 2002; Subcommittee on 
Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005).  Like finding a needle in a haystack, living in a highly populated 
area offers another safeguard for respondents, regardless of their location’s unique contextual 
characteristics (Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005).  Given these reidentification 
mechanisms, the producer must then establish how many sampled individuals – sharing the same 
contextual characteristics – are needed to assure anonymity.  Furthermore they must decide upon the 
minimal population size of a geographic unit that adequately obscures the identities of its residents, 
contemplating how the utility of data may be affected by the disproportionate suppression of contextual 
information for low-density areas. 
 
Finally, the producer must assess the number of persons sharing the same identifying personal 
characteristics for individuals within the population, other external datasets, and within the survey dataset 
following similar steps used in estimating the disclosure risk of geographic units.  In doing so, they need to 
define what constitutes anonymity for individuals nested within contexts as dictated by their personal 
characteristics.  The risk associated with the personal characteristics of survey respondents is heightened 
under a hierarchical framework of reidentification.  When contextual data are not included on a file, the 
search for person-level matches is open to the full population.  However risk would generally increase 
when we limit the matching process to persons living in similar contextual environments, especially if 
these contexts are fairly uncommon.  
 
From this empirical approach, I develop a hierarchical matching algorithm composed of different 
components of risk stemming from the contextual and personal characteristics of survey respondents.  In 
the following section, I describe my measures of these risk components and discuss the methodological 
issues that arise when implementing this type of disclosure analysis.  For the rest of the paper, I conduct 
an experimental study that: (1) utilizes a limited version of this algorithm and (2) systematically varies the 
characteristics of contextual data that are associated with a single synthetic sample of persons and their 
locations.  Assessing the marginal contributions of three components of locational disclosure risk, I 
illustrate how the translation of locational risk to survey respondents influences the design of 
contextualized datasets.   
3.  Assumptions and Hypotheses 
 3. a. Hierarchical Matching Algorithm    
Indicative of the risk associated with a public-use datafile, “Aggregate Disclosure Risk” is the fraction of 
person-records that an intruder can confidently reidentify, calculated as the proportion of survey 
respondents who have unique characteristics (i.e., AR).  For microdata that characterize individuals and 
their geographic contexts, estimating the likelihood of reidentifying survey respondents (i.e., R I, J ) 
depends on studying two populations:  persons and locations.  Presented in Equations 1 to 5, I develop a 
hierarchical matching algorithm that considers the geographic distribution of survey respondents as well 
as their personal and contextual characteristics, formulating five components of risk.  The hierarchical 
assessment of risk is a recursive process in that disclosure analysis should be performed in four stages, 
where each step builds upon and reciprocates with another. 
Setting the stage, the number of persons who share the same personal ( i ) and contextual ( j ) 
characteristics is a function of the dispersion of persons across space  (i.e., Y I, J | i, j ), as defined by the 
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survey’s sampling methodology (T).  Identifying geography- and person- matches within the population 
and sample also depends on four characteristics of a dataset:  the spatial scale of contexts (S), 
geographic identifiers (G), the number of identifying personal and contextual keys (K), and the coarseness 
of their measures (M).1  It is the interplay between these distributions – persons nested within geography 
and variation in measurement – that determine the likelihood that a survey respondent is reidentified and, 
ultimately, the amount of risk associated with a dataset’s identifying information (i.e., Z i, j ).   
Given these distributions and unperturbed contextual data provided from census tabulations, the first 
stage in the hierarchical assessment of risk requires that the data producer appraise how easy it is to 
reidentify a geographic unit given perfectly accurate information about its characteristics (Lambert 1993; 
Duncan and Lambert 1989).  Using simple combinations of key variables, the probability of a geographic 
unit being reidentified depends on the number of its matches found in the populations of counties, tracts, 
and blockgroups; where “matches” are those units sharing the same set of characteristics (i.e., A j ).  A set 
of geographic units – having the same characteristics – are considered anonymous when there are at 
least T1 in the set, where T1 represents a selected “geography population unique” threshold. 
After distinguishing sets of geographic units resembling one another (i.e., contextual matchsets), it is then 
necessary to identify individual-level characteristics that are rarely found in the general population for each 
contextual matchset.  Because an intruder may know about a person’s participation in a survey, one must 
also identify respondents having unique characteristics (Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation 
Methodology 2005; Sweeney 2002).  So for the second stage of the analysis, the producer assesses the 
number of survey respondents who share the same identifying personal and contextual characteristics 
within the population (i.e., B i, j ) and the sample (i.e., C i, j ).  An individual is considered anonymous when at 
least T2 people in the population and T3 survey respondents have the same characteristics, where T2 and T3 
represent selected “person population unique” and “person sample unique” thresholds.  Estimating the joint 
probability that a respondent has individual and contextual variables that do not uniquely identify them 
within the population and the survey, the search for person-matches is constrained to people sharing 
common contexts.  The risk associated with personal characteristics generally increases when we limit the 
search for person-matches to specific contexts (i.e., Pr [ B i, j ]  <  Pr [ B i ] and Pr [ C i, j ]  <  [ C i ] ). 
 
Utilizing data constructed from the above evaluations in a third set of analyses, the producer considers 
another piece of identifying information for geographic units that is based on the nested nature of a 
respondent’s contextual and personal characteristics.  An approximated set of contextual measures can 
be derived from the personal characteristics of survey respondents who share the same contexts.  For 
instance, a new “age” composition measure characterizing an unidentified context is derived from the 
proportion of respondents living in “Context A” who are age 65 and over.  “Context A” is described as a 
set of contexts that have 80 to 85 percent of their population living in poverty (as identified by census 
tabulations).  Let’s take as an example the 20 respondents living in 3 sampled tracts having 80 to 85% of 
their population in poverty, where 3 of these persons are age 65 and over.  The intruder can then limit his 
search within an external database to geographic units sharing this contextual trait (i.e., tracts with 80 to 
85% persons in poverty, “Context A”), identifying geographic units who resemble each other in terms of 
the new composition measure (i.e., “Context A” tracts with 15% of their population age 65 and over).   
Research by Ragunathan, et al. (2007; need citation) have indicated that this type of disclosure (i.e., D i, j ) 
poses significant risk.  A set of geographic units – having the same approximate contextual characteristics 
– are considered anonymous when there are at least T4 in the set, where T4 represents a selected 
“approximate population unique” threshold. 
And lastly, the producer can consider the protective roles of a geographic unit’s population size (i.e., E i, j | J 
).  Even when a location may be pinpointed within the population using extant contextual measures (i.e., A 
j ) and approximated contextual measures (i.e., D i, j ), the ability to identify a specific respondent is 
negligible when she lives in a highly-populated area.  However this protection is only offered to 
respondents assured k-anonymity (i.e., C i, j ).  An individual is considered anonymous when at least T3 
survey respondents have the same identifying personal and contextual characteristics, and when they live 
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in an area with a population of T5 or more (where T5 represents a selected “geographic unit population-
size” threshold).   
AR   =   Σ ( Pr [ R I, J ] )         ( 1 ) 
Pr [ R  I, J ]   =  1 – ( Pr [ Y I, J | i, j ]  x  Pr [ Z i, j  ] )       ( 2 ) 
Pr [ Z i, j ]   =  Pr [ ( A j   ∩   B i, j   ∩   C i, j   ∩   D i, j )   U   ( C i, j   ∩   E i, j | J )  ]   ( 3 ) 
Pr [ Y I, J | i, j ]   =  f ( T )          ( 4 ) 
Pr [ Z i, j ] = f ( T, S, G, K, M )         ( 5 ) 
Where:  
AR  = Proportion of survey respondents who are easily reidentified 
R I, J   =  Survey respondent ( I ) in sampled geographic unit ( J ) is easily reidentified,  
  given identifying “personal” variables ( i ), “contextual” variables ( j ), and  
  “approximate contextual” variables ( i, j ) 
Y I, J | i, j   =  Survey respondent ( I ) in sampled geographic unit ( J )  
  has identifying “personal” variables ( i ), “contextual” variables ( j ),  
  and “approximate contextual” variables ( i, j )  
Z i, j   =  Identifying “personal” variables ( i ), “contextual” variables ( j ), and  
  “approximate contextual” variables ( i, j ) are safe for release 
A j   =  Combination of values of “contextual” variables ( j ) is considered safe  
  if combination occurs at least T1 times among geographic unit population 
B i, j   =  Combination of values of identifying “personal” variables ( i ) and  
  “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  if combination occurs at least T2 times among person population  
C i, j   =  Combination of values of identifying “personal” variables ( i ) and 
  “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  if combination occurs at least T3 times among survey respondents  
D i, j  = Combination of values of identifying “personal” variables ( i ) and 
  “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  if combination of values of “approximate contextual” variables ( i, j )  
  occurs at least T4 times among geographic unit population 
  [ “approximate contextual” variables ( i, j ) derived from  
  identifying “personal” variables ( i ) among survey respondents  
  with “contextual” variables ( j ) ]  
E i, j | J   = Combination of values of identifying “personal” variables ( i ) and 
  “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  when the population size of sampled geographic unit ( J ) is T5 or more persons 
T  = Sampling methodology 
S  = Spatial scale of contextual data 
G  =  Identified geography 
K  =  Number of identifying “personal” or “contextual” keys 
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M  =  Masking technique 
 
Assumption-1:  T1  =  “Geography Population Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-2:  T2  =  “Person Population Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-3:  T3  =  “Person Sample Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-4:  T4  =  “Approximate Population Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-5:  T5  =  “Geographic Unit Population-Size” Threshold 
 
The contribution of each component to aggregate risk depends on another, indicated by the covariation 
between ( A j and B i, j ), ( B i, j and C i, j ), ( C i, j and D i, j ), and ( C i, j and E i, j | J ).  Summarizing these 
relationships, the size of contextual matchsets (i.e., the number of geographic units resembling each 
other) determines the likelihood of identifying persons, nested therein, who have similar individual 
characteristics.  If a set of personal and contextual characteristics are found to be unique within the 
population, then they are also unique within a survey’s sample.  Large numbers of survey respondents 
sharing common contexts enhances the estimation of approximate contextual variables, with small 
contextual matchsets narrowing the search for uniques within the geographic-unit population.  Finally the 
protection offered by dense populations can be offered to more survey respondents when more sets of 
personal and contextual characteristics are rare within the general population, but are commonly found 
within the sample.      
 
 3. b.  Current Study’s Matching Algorithm:  Modifications and Implications 
 
Because of these joint distributions, it is useful to study each component’s marginal contribution to 
aggregate risk.  In doing so, we can assess the largest contributors and develop disclosure limitation 
methodologies that best minimize reidentification.  The spatial distribution of respondents, Y I, J | -, j , and 
geography population uniques, A j, are fundamental structures that determine the efficiencies of all other 
components.  In turn, this study seeks to inform the design of confidential datasets by assessing these 
key determinants of risk and how they relate to two modified components, C -, j and E -, j | J .  Building upon 
these baseline estimates by assessing person-level characteristics along with contextual information (i.e., 
Y I, J | i, j ), the ultimate level of aggregate risk would then a function of the full formulation of the studied 
components (i.e., C i, j and E i, j | J ) and the assessment of those unobserved (i.e., B i, j and D i, j ).  
 
As described in this study’s limited hierarchical matching algorithm (Equations 6 to 10), I conduct 
disclosure analyses of geographic units, measuring the degree to which locational risk translates to 
survey respondents.  I assess the likelihood of identifying unique locations among the total population of 
geographies and among my survey respondents.  I also appraise how much locational risk declines when 
I assume that high-density areas adequately obscure respondent identity, regardless of location 
reidentification.  However, I do not estimate the amount of disclosure risk resulting from individual-level 
characteristics of survey respondents.  A full-assessment requires confidential information gathered from 
a real survey of persons, or at least a synthesized set of person-level characteristics, going beyond the 
scope of this study.   
 
In turn, I focus my analyses on identifying problematic sets of contextual information (i.e., Z -, j ) and the 
implications for reidentifying individuals (i.e., R I, J ).  The distribution of contextual variables characterizing 
these survey locations (i.e., Y I, J | -, j ) is determined by my experiment’s sampling methodology.  Indicative 
of the locational risk associated with a set of individual survey respondents, I then define “Locational 
Disclosure Risk”, my outcome of interest, as the fraction of person-records that an intruder can confidently 
pinpoint their location.  For each dataset, I calculate this as the proportion of survey respondents residing 
in an easily reidentified geographic unit (i.e., LR). 
 
The proportion of survey respondents who are easily re-identified from contextual variables is derived 
from three components of risk:  A j , C -, j , and E -, j | J . Providing estimates for these components of 
locational risk, I tally the number of contextual-matches found in the population of geographies (i.e., A j ) 
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as well as those associated with my survey respondents (i.e., C -, j ) and whether these matches are high-
density areas (i.e., E -, j | J ), incorporating a “geography population unique” threshold of 20 (T1), a “person 
sample unique” threshold of 3 (T3), and a “geographic unit population-size” threshold of 100,000 (T5).  
 
LR   =   Σ ( Pr [ R I, J ] )         ( 6 ) 
Pr [ R  I, J ]   =  1 – ( Pr [ Y I, J | -, j ]  x  Pr [ Z -, j  ] )       ( 7 ) 
Pr [ Z -, j ]   =  Pr [ ( A j   ∩   C -, j )   U   ( C -, j   ∩   E -, j | J ) ]     ( 8 ) 
Pr [ Y I, J | -, j ]   =  f ( T )          ( 9 ) 
Pr [ Z -, j ] = f ( T, S, G, K, M )         ( 10 ) 
T  = Sampling methodology 
S  = Spatial scale of contextual data 
G  =  Identified geography 
K  =  Number of identifying “personal” or “contextual” keys 
M  =  Masking technique 
 
Where:  
R I, J   =  Survey respondent ( I ) in sampled geographic unit ( J ) is easily reidentified,  
  given “contextual” variables ( j ) 
Y I, J | -, j   =  Survey respondent ( I ) in sampled geographic unit ( J ) has “contextual” variables ( j ) 
Z -, j   =  Identifying “contextual” variables ( j ) are safe for release 
A j   =  Combination of values of “contextual” variables ( j ) is considered safe  
  if combination occurs at least T1 times among geographic unit population 
C -, j   =  Combination of values of “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  if combination occurs at least T3 times among survey respondents  
E -, j | J   = Combination of values of “contextual” variables ( j ) are considered safe  
  when the population size of sampled geographic unit ( J ) is T5 or more persons 
 
Assumption-1:  Pr [ Y I, J | i, j ] = Pr [ Y I, J | -, j ] 
Assumption-2:  Pr [ C i, j ] = Pr [ C -, j ] 
Assumption-3:  T1  =  20, “Geography Population Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-4:  T3  =  3, “Person Sample Unique” Threshold 
Assumption-5:  T5  =  100,000, “Geographic Unit Population-Size” Threshold 
 
In that I do not have the joint distribution of personal and contextual characteristics for a set of actual 
survey respondents, I make a simplifying assumption in my assessment of locational risk (i.e., Pr [ C  i, j ] = 
Pr [ C -, j ] ).  Among those drawn from similar contexts, I assume that there are sufficient numbers of 
respondents with the same personal identifiers; and that risk only accrues when few respondents share 
contexts.  As an illustrative example, “Context A” is described as a set of tracts that have 80 to 85 percent 
of their population living in poverty (as characterized by census tabulations) while “Persona B” is 
described as “white, male, 40 years-old”.  There is no disclosure risk when: (1) three people live in 
“Context A” and (2) all three people have “Persona B”.  If the first stipulation is met, I assume that the 
second is always true.   
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When personal information from a real survey of individuals is incorporated into the disclosure analysis, 
the risk from “person sample uniques” should generally be higher (i.e., Pr [ C  i, j ]  <  Pr [ C -, j ] ).  The 
degree to which my modified estimate increases is a function of the real survey’s sampling design that 
selects geographic units and individuals therein as well as its provision of identifying person-level 
information for respondents.   
 
My study’s synthetic sample of persons is (in essence) a random sample of individuals scattered across 
the United States, reflecting the areal distribution of the population (i.e., Y I, J | i, j ). This sampling approach 
maximizes the dispersion of respondents across space and purposely does not heap respondents within 
any particular geographic unit.  Taking a bottom-up approach in my contextualization of my microdata 
files, I take my set of respondents and build contexts around them, instead of selecting geographic units 
first and then sampling for persons.  Because my sample is drawn to identify a broad set of contexts that 
are most likely represented in surveys, my estimates of risk associated with “geography population 
uniques” (i.e., Pr [ A j ] ) should be robust.   
 
However my sampling methodology does not reflect how survey data is typically collected.  In reality, 
surveys are likely to have a clustered design where a stratified sample of persons is drawn from primary 
sampling units, defined by geographic location.  The higher the sampling rates of persons within 
geographic units, the more likely we can find adequate numbers of respondents (within shared contexts) 
having the same personal characteristics.  Consequently, a clustered design would reduce risk associated 
with sample uniques in that more persons are drawn from a limited number of geographies (i.e., Pr [ C i, j ] 
≈ 1 ). 
 
The degree to which this component converges to unity is a function of the concentration persons 
sampled within contextual matchsets.  Primary sampling units may take the form of blended geographies, 
where persons are sampled across administrative units.  If these straddled administrative units do not 
have exactly the same contexts, then a clustered sampling design may fail to produce an adequate 
number of respondents with shared personal and contextual characteristics.  Minimizing the role of 
person-identifiers by requiring only three persons be in a contextual matchset for k-anonymity, I provide a 
baseline assessment of how the identification of sample uniques depends on the variability in contextual 
measures among geographic units and how this translates to survey respondents given the likelihood that 
they are residing in any particular location.   
 
In turn, the risk posed by contextual sample uniques ( C -, j ) is primarily an issue for persons residing in 
marginally common contexts (i.e., number of population matches equals t1 where [ 20 < t1 < n ] and n is an 
unknown small value) having relatively little chance of being represented in a dispersed sample (i.e., 
number of sample matches < 3).  Given a sample that captures the contours of the population distribution 
outside administrative units, the chance of a respondent being in any particular contextual matchset is 
then a function of their location’s area size and variability in contextual characteristics.   
 
The spatial scale of geographic units operates in two diametric ways when assessing uniques within a 
sample of persons.  Carving up finite space into units of various sizes influences disclosure risk by (1) 
setting the number of persons within geographic boundaries and (2) determining the number of 
geographic units in the population.  Covering more land area and a higher absolute number of persons, 
large scale geographic units are more likely to have a respondent falling within its boundaries, given a 
randomly distributed sample of persons.  In contrast, the relatively high number of population units for 
small scale geography increases variability in contextual characteristics, promoting the identification of 
uniques.  Given the extremely large number of blockgroups, I expect that these small scale contexts are 
most susceptible to sample uniques, beaconing the need for a refined sampling methodology. 
 
Because counties are relatively large areas that are few in number, I expect that my ad hoc estimates of 
“needle-in-the-haystack” protection are accurate (i.e., Pr [ C i, j   ∩   E i, j | J ]  =  Pr [ C -, j   ∩   E -, j | J ] ).  Most 
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sampling designs should be able to draw adequate numbers of respondents (sharing similar personal 
characteristics) from these relatively homogeneous administrative units.  
 
3. c.  Statistical Properties and Expected Outcomes 
Laws of probability predict that the likelihood of identifying a unique is negatively associated with the 
number of units within the total population.  Consequently, disclosure risk rises with the spatial scale of a 
geographic unit because of declining population size and the possibility of locating matches.  In other 
words, small geographic units – that are large in number – offer more opportunities to locate matches, 
thereby ensuring confidentiality.  Hence risk should be lowest for blockgroups, given the high probability of 
finding multiple matches.  Applying the same logic to counties, risk of disclosure should be highest for 
these large-scale geographic units.    
 
However, these probabilistic patterns are offset when we consider the dispersion of persons across 
geographic units.  The likelihood of having more than one respondent living in similar contexts depends 
on the number of respondents sampled from each geographic unit.  Because relatively few people are 
sampled from any set of “look-alike” blockgroups, the chance of achieving k-anonymity for these small-
scale locations is low.  Besides promoting k-anonymity, large counties also compensate for the small 
number of geographic units themselves in that people living in highly populated areas are considerably 
less likely to be reidentified.  Given these population-dispersion factors, disclosure risk should actually 
decrease with the spatial scale of contextual data. 
 
Besides these scale and dispersion factors, the ability to reidentify geographic units varies with the scope 
of the study. Directly identifying state/regional location and MSA-status limits the size of the population 
that is matched upon by confining the disclosure assessment to units within these areas, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of locating uniques. In turn, risk should generally be higher with the release of 
state, regional, and population density variables. Furthermore risk of reidentification should be highest 
when state-location is known because they are precise geographies covering the smallest land area.  
 
The ability to identify population uniques is further enhanced when more information is provided about a 
given location. Consequently geographic units are generally more easily reidentified in datasets with 
relatively large numbers of contextual measures. The amount of risk resulting from these keys depends 
on the coarseness of their measurement. 
 
Expected Disclosure Risk Associated with the Translation of Locational Risk to  
Survey Respondents and Design Elements of Contextual Data 
Translation of Locational Risk to Respondents Design Elements 











Identified Geography,  
Number & Coarseness of  
Contextual Variables  





Counties           +++ No Change + + 




Tracts                ++ No Change No Change ++ Region, 3-Keys, or  10%-Categories ++ 
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Blockgroups      + +++ No Change +++ State, 5-Keys, or 1%-Categories     +++ 
3. d.  Specific Considerations 
To broadly inform the design of survey datasets, I construct a moderately-sized, cross-sectional sample of 
individuals that is randomly drawn to reflect each state’s population distribution.  In selecting my 
reidentification thresholds (i.e., T1, T3, and T5), I take into account these survey characteristics as well as 
my project’s need to concurrently study a variety of contextual data – whereby I consistently apply these 
parameters across all datasets.  
Using statistical inference, survey respondents can refute an intruder’s assertion that she has correctly 
reidentified their location.  But to provide convincing evidence, researchers must certify that the chances 
of an intruder’s match being correct is no better than if the intruder chose it at random from the other 
matches in the set.  Hence, the task at hand is to avoid type I errors where we have mistakenly rejected 
the null hypothesis (H0) that the intruder’s locational-match is correct.  Assuming that the significance level 
(or p-value) of 0.05 provides a sufficient test of this hypothesis, there is a 5-in-100 chance of wrongly 
rejecting the intruder’s claim, if it is in fact true.  If we are unable to reject the null hypothesis, it only 
suggests that there is not sufficient evidence against the intruder even though the match may still be 
incorrect.  By correctly rejecting the null hypothesis, we can assuredly deny the intruder’s claim.  This is 
discussed in greater detail in VanWey, et al. (2005). 
Although the p-value of 0.05 has been established as the standard for correctly rejecting null hypotheses 
(i.e., avoiding type I errors), this significance-level may be inadequate when applied to the disclosure of 
geographic units.  Intruder costs – associated with verifying reidentified locations – are significantly 
affected by a dataset’s scope which concentrates the geographic dispersion of matches.  The question 
then becomes: Given the close proximity of matches, do intruders gather additional information that 
increases our chances of incorrectly rejecting their claim?  If this is true, researchers may want to lower 
their significance level to offset reduced intruder costs associated with a dataset’s release of geographic 
identifiers; whereby smaller p-values indicate stronger evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis.  Further 
research is needed to inform this decision.  
When deciding what constitutes adequate protection, researchers must also contemplate how the utility of 
their data will be affected.  Given the small number of large geographic units, counties are generally 
easier to reidentify – based solely on the number of potential matches, without regards to the number and 
coarseness of contextual measures.  Suppressing data for “at-risk” geographic units, contextual data 
would primarily be released for an extremely homogeneous set of counties; thereby reducing variation in 
these measures to the point where they become analytically useless. This suppression bias is 
exacerbated with increased confidence threshold-levels.  
Finally when choosing a “geography population unique” threshold (i.e., T1), researchers need to consider 
the spatial scale of contexts and whether the dataset will provide identifying geographic information.  
Reducing the number of matches, the ability to provide convincing evidence is significantly lowered when 
a dataset increases its contextual scale or limits its scope of study.   
While I am unable to address variability in intruder costs, I do incorporate a consistent definition of risk 
that maximizes data utility across all test datasets.  In turn, I choose the reidentification confidence level of 
p>0.05, where “at-risk” geographic units are those with 1 to 19 matches.  This reidentification confidence 
level conversely translates into a confidence threshold value of 20, where contextual data are considered 
safe for release when geographic units have twenty or more matches  (i.e., T1=20).    
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Besides intruder costs, researchers also need to consider the characteristics of their sampling 
methodology and the spatial scale of contexts when selecting a “person sample unique” threshold (i.e., 
T3).  While it may be more desirable to have five respondents in the sample with the same contexts, 
achieving this threshold may not be feasible given a moderately small sample of persons thinly distributed 
across numerous geographic units.  Incorporating a threshold commonly used in federal survey research 
(Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation Methodology 2005) and addressing my need to study 
blockgroups, I consider contextual data safe for release when three or more survey respondents have 
exactly the same key-values (i.e., T3=3).   
When choosing a “geographic unit population-size” threshold (i.e., T5), researchers need to consider such 
survey characteristics as its provision of longitudinal information and detailed data on social networks; as 
well as the sampling rate of persons within geographic units.  The more people drawn from an area, the 
less affective the protection offered by its large population.  It is also relatively easy to reidentify persons 
in a high-density area when intruders can utilize information describing a person’s life over an extended 
period of time or their family members.  
The U.S. Census Bureau has set disclosure standards allowing for the release of geographic information 
onto microdata files (5% sample) for areas with 100,000 or more persons (U.S. Census Bureau 2003).  
For panel surveys containing detailed information, the Census Bureau has an alternative approach.  For 
instance, the Survey of Income and Program Participation does not identify states and metropolitan areas 
with populations less than 250,000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).  Given the characteristics of my 
hypothetical survey, I apply the processing rule where survey respondents – living in counties with 
100,000 or more persons – cannot be reidentified from their contextual characteristics (i.e., T5=100,000).   
 
4.  Assessing Disclosure Risk of Masked Contextual Data 
As the empirical basis of my study, I conduct experiments to assess the amount of disclosure risk 
associated with a dataset’s contextual data (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2001a).  Using the test microdata 
file as my unit of analysis, the proportion of survey respondents whose locations are easily reidentified as 
the outcome of interest, and associated experimental traits, I produce descriptive analyses to test my 
hypotheses.  In doing so, I followed six methodological steps: 
 
• select contextual measures and identify population of base variable sets; 
• draw a sample of base variable sets; 
• construct test datasets that vary in spatial scale of contextual measures, identified geography, 
number of keys, and masking method, holding constant sample of base variable sets; 
• construct microdata files composed of a single synthetic sample of survey respondents, attaching 
test datasets of contextual information to these person-level records; 
• reidentify locations of survey respondents, using available geographic identifiers and contextual 
data for counties, tracts, and blockgroups; and 
• calculate aggregate disclosure risk for each test microdata file as proportion of survey respondents 
whose geographic location is easily reidentified, identifying datasets having risk-levels falling below 
5%.   
4. a.  Sources, Measures, and Sampled Datasets of Contextual Data 
My sources of contextual data are summary files tabulated from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 2000a, 2000b, 2000c).  These summary files are prominent 
public-use databases within the social sciences, providing a diversity of measures and a range of 
geographic detail. Contextual data are compiled from published tabulations for all blockgroups, tracts, and 
counties in the United States.  
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To identify which measures would be of most interest to researchers, I draw on the sociological literature 
on stratification, residential segregation and mobility, and labor markets. I limit my test datasets to those 
having subsets of the seventeen concepts (i.e., base variables) listed below.  
 
• Race/Ethnic Composition  
o % Persons, Non-Hispanic White 
o % Persons, Non-Hispanic African-American  
o % Persons, Non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander 
o % Persons, Non-Hispanic Other Race 
o % Persons, Hispanic 
o % Persons, Foreign-Born 
o % Foreign-Born, Naturalized Citizens 
o % Households, Linguistically Isolated 
 
• Socioeconomic Status  
o % Persons, In-Poverty 
o % Households, With Wage Income 
o % Households, Receiving Public Assistance 
o % Persons Age 25+, College Degree 
 
• Social Context 
o % Families, Female-Headed 
o % Persons Age 16-19, Neither Enrolled nor Graduated from High School 
o % Housing Units, Owner-Occupied 
 
• Labor Market  
o % Persons Age 16+, Civilian Labor Force 
o % Civilian Labor Force, Unemployed 
 
The conceptual content of datasets varies with (1) the number of base variables (i.e., k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and 
(2) which base variables are included in the sets. All possible combinations of base variables (i.e., base 
variables sets) are constructed for sets containing one, two, three, four, and five concepts (N k = 17; 136; 
680; 2,380; 6,188; respectively). I compile datasets – holding constant a specific base variable set – by 
varying its spatial scale, identified geography, and masking technique.  Consequently, I can better clarify 
risk factors associated with spatial scale and geographic relationships and avoid confounding my results 
with varying sub-domains. 
 
Relationships between variables within a dataset have implications for reidentification and vary with the 
geographic scale of the measures.  Large amounts of variation within measures (i.e., wide range of 
values) increase the likelihood of identifying uniques and, therefore, disclosure risk. However large 
amounts of collinearity among measures may allow producers to release more variables within a dataset 
without drastically increasing disclosure risk.  To assure an unbiased selection of measures that are 
representative of the degrees of variance and collinearity among all possible datasets, I sample 137 sets 
of base variables composed of one to five concepts.  All seventeen base variable sets with a single 
concept are included in my study.  Thirty datasets are randomly sampled from each stratum of the 
multiple-concept base variable sets.  An assessment of the effectiveness of this sampling approach is 
presented in a working paper that is available upon request. 
4. b.  Experimental Traits 
Given a finite number of sampled sets of contextual concepts (n=137), datasets (C b,s,g,m) are varied along 
the [B x S x G x M] matrix of: (1) base variable sets (b = 1 to 137, described above); (2) spatial scales of 
contextual data (s = 1, 2, 3 = counties, tracts, blockgroups); (3) identified geographies (g = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
= none, population density, division, state, population density and division, population density and state); 
and (4) masking techniques (m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 = 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and Top and Bottom-25% 
categories). Consequently, 14,796 datasets (= 137 x 3 x 6 x 6) are compiled and assessed.   
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Illustrating this nomenclature, two datasets are compiled using one of the sampled set of concepts 
consisting of five base variables (b=137): (1) % Persons, Non-Hispanic White; (2) % Persons, Foreign-
Born; (3) % Households, Receiving Public Assistance; (4) % Housing Units, Owner-Occupied; and (5) % 
Civilian Labor Force, Unemployed.  Test dataset (C 137,1,1,1) contains these five contextual variables 
measured at the county-level (s=1) without any geographic identifiers (g=1), masked into 1% categories 
(m=1).  In comparison, test dataset (C 137,3,3,3) contains these five contextual variables measured at the 
blockgroup-level (s=3) along with the identification of division (g=3), masked into 5% categories (m=3). 
 
Presented in Appendix Table A-1, equal proportions of datasets across categories of spatial scale, 
geographic identifiers, and masking techniques reflect my experimental design. Taking a base variable set 
of concepts, I compile datasets that systematically vary across a matrix of these experimental traits.  
However, the proportions of datasets across categories of the number and conceptual composition of 
contextual variables reflect the random sampling of base variables sets, stratified by key-sets (i.e., 
including all 17 sets with 1 key; including 30 sets each with 2, 3, 4, and 5 keys). Every conceptual domain 
(i.e., base variable) is represented in my test datasets. Fifteen of the seventeen concepts were included in 
15 to 24% of the datasets.  However, “% Persons, Non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander” was least likely 
to be represented (7% of datasets); while “% Persons, Non-Hispanic White” was most often represented 
(31% of datasets).  These inconsistencies are strictly random artifacts. 
Given these base variable sets, I constrain my matching process by geographic identifiers released in the 
dataset.  A dataset can directly identify the state, division, and population density of respondent location.  
U.S. Census geographic divisions categorize states into seven regional groups of (1) New England, (2) 
Middle Atlantic, (3) East North Central, (4) West North Central, (5) South Atlantic, (6) East South Central, 
(7) West South Central, (8) Mountain, and (9) Pacific.  Population density is defined by three categories of 
MSA-status: (1) MSA 1-million or more, (2) MSA less than 1-million, and (3) Non-MSA (Sources: U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). Measured at the county-level, these data are also used to 
characterize the population density of tracts and blockgroups.   
Finally I systematically vary the amount of measurement detail across my experimental datasets; thereby 
assessing how rates of local suppression fluctuate with global recoding schema.  After top-coding and 
bottom-coding my continuous variables to conceal outliers, I recode contextual measures into six grades 
of coarseness (i.e., 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and Top and Bottom-25% categories).  Outliers were 
identified as those within the top and bottom 0.5% of each variables distribution (Zayatz, 2005), given 
geographically-specific distributions defined by each dataset’s identified geography.  Contextual variables 
are recoded into aggregated categories based on their absolute values (i.e., absolute recoding).  For 
example, let us consider a county having 72% of its population that is non-Hispanic White.  Coarsening 
the measure into 10%-categories, the county would be characterized as having an absolute value that 
falls between 70% and 80%.2 
 
Global Recoding of Contextual Variables 
Coarseness of  
Contextual Variables  
Metric 
Spaces Absolute Values 
Coarseness of  
Contextual Variables 
Metric 
Spaces Absolute Values 
1%-Categories              100 0%, 1%, 2% . . .  98%, 99%, 100% 15%-Categories 7 
0 - 14%, 15 - 29%, . . .  
75 - 89%, 90 -100% 
5%-Categories               20 0 - 4%,  5 - 9%, . . .  90 - 94%, 95 - 100% 20%-Categories 5 
0 - 19%,  20 - 39%, . . .  
60 - 79%, 80 - 100% 
10%-Categories        10 0 - 9%,  10 - 19%, . . . 80 - 89%, 90 - 100% 
Top, Bottom-25% 
Categories 3     
Top-25%, Bottom-25%, 
Other 
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4.c.  Synthetic Sample of Survey Respondents and their Geographic Locations 
I derive synthetic person-records with attached contextual data from a sample of blocks represented in the 
2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 2000a). A stratified sample 
of blocks is drawn to reflect the areal distribution of the U.S. population across states. The block is chosen 
as my sampling unit because it most closely approximates the residential location of our theoretically ideal 
sample of individual survey respondents (i.e., persons). Being the foundational spatial unit from which all 
geographies are built upon, blocks also pinpoint various contexts to a single location. In turn, tabulations 
from identified counties, tracts, and blockgroups, which overlap with my sampled blocks, are included in 
my study as contextual data. These contextual data are then represented in a synthetic dataset of person-
records.  
 
Fifty state-specific block samples (excluding the District of Columbia) are drawn with probability-
proportional-to-size without replacement (PPS).  Each block within a state has a probability of selection 
that is proportional to its population density, defined as the total number of persons per square meter of 
block area. Whereas I am not studying how individual-level characteristics shape disclosure risk, I 
purposely set the number of person-records to one per sampled block-unit.  By sampling one person per 
block, I disperse my survey respondents as thinly as possible over space.  Presented in Appendix Table 
A-3, 11,475 blocks are sampled, representing 11,475 synthetic persons dispersed across approximately 
5% of all blockgroups, 14% of all tracts, and 57% of all counties in the U.S. 
 
My dispersed sampling approach broadens the selection of locations for study; thereby enhancing the 
assessment of risk associated with contextual data.  It also furnishes the most cautious (or highest) 
estimates of locational risk resulting from sample uniques.  Representing the antithesis of modern survey 
collection methodology, my sample provides a baseline for future work that explores disclosure risk 
associated with clustered and hierarchical designs.   
4. d. Locational Disclosure Risk Associated with Test Datasets  
The foundation of my first component of locational disclosure risk (i.e., A j ) is the confidence-level of 
correctly identifying the location of a survey respondent among a population of geographic units.  Given 
the p-value of .05, I assume that I can strongly refute an intruder’s claim of correctly reidentifying a 
location (H0) when there is a 5-in-100 (or less) chance of wrongly rejecting this hypothesis (VanWey, et. 
al, 2005).  Taking the inverse of this confidence-level, a geographic unit is considered easily reidentified 
when it has fewer than 20 matches (i.e., at_risk=1).   
To ascertain the number of matches, I compare the contextual characteristics associated with a sample of 
locations – with a master contextual file containing the same measures for the full population of 
geographic units and their identifying information. Data in the master file are top and bottom coded and 
collapsed into intervals as defined by the test dataset.  In that my test datasets also directly identify 
population density, division, and state-location, I further refine my matching process by utilizing 
geographically-specific master contextual files.  Because contextual data for a sample of locations are 
originally drawn from this master file and have not been perturbed, the identification of matches is exact.  
Consequently, counting the number of matches simply requires that I tabulate the number of geographic 
units in the population file having a specified set of contextual characteristics, coinciding with those found 
in my experimental survey (Winkler 2004). 
Assessing other disclosure mechanisms that transfer locational risk to individual survey respondents (i.e.,  
C -, j and E -, j | J ), I apply two additional processing rules that follow established standards for k-anonymity 
and releasing geographic information on public-use microdata files.  A person’s geographic location is 
also considered easily reidentified when less than three respondents share the same contextual 
characteristics (i.e., at_risk=1, if number of matches in sample is less than 3).  This is true even when their 
location characteristics are commonly found in the population.  Furthermore respondents located in 
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counties with 100,000 or more persons are assigned a null value of risk, for respondents whose 
contextual characteristics are commonly found in the survey (i.e., at_risk=0, if number of matches in 
sample is 3 or more).   
 
After assessing whether a sampled geographic unit is considered easily reidentified, the “at-risk” status of 
this location is then attached to survey respondents who reside in the area (i.e., A j ).  A person’s “at-risk” 
status is further refined to reflect their uniqueness within the survey as well as their location’s population 
density (i.e.,  C -, j and E -, j | J ).  Measuring the amount of aggregate risk associated with a dataset from 
these three components, I calculate weighted proportions of survey respondents who are considered “at-
risk” of being reidentified because of the release of contextual data (i.e., proportion of respondents with 
at_risk=1).  Using this summary measure, I create an indicator that characterizes a dataset as having less 
than 5% of survey respondents whose geographic location is easily reidentified (i.e., suppress5=1).   
 
For blockgroup- and tract-level contextual data, locational risk directly translates to respondents because 
these small scale areas always have sparse populations (i.e., less than 100,000 persons).  However, risk 
posed by county-level contextual data may be negated by the protection offered by dense populations.  
Consequently, I create two sets of estimates for county-level datasets:  (1) for all survey respondents and 
(2) for respondents living in areas with less than 100,000 persons.   
 
Analyzing metadata characterizing my sample of 14,796 datasets (see Appendix Table A-3 for further 
details), I render estimates that are generalized to all possible datasets.  In doing so, I produce estimates 
of the average aggregate risk and the proportion of datasets with minimal suppression rates for various 
reidentification components.3   
5.  Presentation of Results  
When designing a public-use dataset, a producer seeks to release as much information as possible while 
ensuring that all locations are kept confidential.  In doing so, a producer needs to consider the trade-offs 
in data utility when defining acceptable levels of (1) local suppression, (2) measurement detail, and (3) 
contextual content.  These sources of information, or information loss, have distinct implications. 
 
Rates of local suppression are reflected by the level of aggregate risk, expressed as the proportion of 
respondents whose contextual data may not be safely released.  Perturbative methods, such as 
swapping, can then be used to construct confidential information that replaces these missing values.  The 
producer must consider how these ascribed data may distort analyses and whether a group of geographic 
units is particularly affected by these aberrations.   
 
Establishing an acceptable rate of local suppression, the producer can achieve this aggregate risk-level 
by coarsening the contextual measures.  However, if the necessary amount of coarsening results in 
analytically useless data, the producer may decide to release fewer contextual variables or less specific 
geographic identifiers. 
 
Given these decision-making factors, I offer descriptive analyses that inform the design of confidential 
datasets.  Each series in the following figures represents a different facet of the assessment of disclosure 
risk for contextual data, characterized according to: (1) the configuration of spatial data and (2) the nature 
of the reidentification process.  In a previous study, I conducted disclosure analyses of geographic units, 
analyzing non-hierarchical spatial data (Witkowski 2007).  I now analyze hierarchical datafiles composed 
of contextualized person-records to assess how locational risk extends from a sample of geographic units 
to a set of survey respondents nested therein. Segueing between this work and the current study, I 
provide risk estimates that are at the geographic-level as well as the person-level.   
 
 
[ Figures A, B, C Here ] 
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Identifying uniques within the population of geographic units (i.e., blue bars), half of all counties and just 
over a third of all tracts and blockgroups are easily reidentified (50%, 37%, and 36%, respectively).  
Reidentification rates for counties represented in my disperse sample of respondents generally mirror 
those found in the general population (52%).  This is not surprising since 57% of counties are sampled.  
Given my synthetic methodology, densely populated counties are also more likely to be sampled and 
these highly populated areas tend to exhibit slightly more unique characteristics, increasing risk by 2 
percentage-points. The concentration of persons within rare counties is further indicated by the 11 
percentage-point increase in risk when this component of locational risk is translated to survey 
respondents (63%, up from 52%).   
 
Disclosure risk for sampled tracts (39%) is also approximately equal to its population (37%), with 14% of 
tracts being sampled.  But unlike counties, persons are not concentrated into unique tracts since 
aggregate risk-levels change very little with its translation to survey respondents (40%).  The reason for 
the lack of a conversion shift is the methodology underlying the construction of these administrative units 
which places a cap on their population size.  With as many as 1,500 to 8,000 people, census tracts 
designate areas that are relatively uniform in their population characteristics, economic status, and living 
conditions (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).   
 
With as many as 600 to 3,000 people, blockgroups subdivide tracts into areas bounded by visible and 
legal features (e.g., streets, property lines) (U.S. Census Bureau 2000); whereby space is further 
delineated into units that are relatively small in area, large in number, and heterogeneous.  As a result, 
blockgroup-level data exhibit considerably more variation in contextual characteristics, having substantial 
disclosure ramifications.  With a sampling rate of 5%, blockgroups selected for study have relatively 
common contextual characteristics and, thus, lower levels of risk (27%), compared to the full population of 
geographic units (36%).  This pattern is expected given central tendency theory, whereby the 
characteristics of a sample reflect those most often found in the population.  As with tract-level data, 
blockgroups also have similar levels of locational risk regardless if estimates are derived from geographic- 
or person- units (27%).   
 
Taking person-level estimates of the first risk component as a baseline (i.e., solid green bars), the 
locations of respondents may be further compromised from contexts rarely found among those surveyed.  
Earlier I searched for matches within the population of geographies, but now I turn my search for matches 
to those within a sample of persons.  Given my dispersed sample of individuals, the likelihood that 
numerous respondents fall within a similar contextual setting depends on the areal size of locations as 
well the distribution of contextual characteristics among the geographic population. 
 
As the fourth series indicates (i.e., striped green bars), this type of risk does not emanate from county- 
and tract- level contexts.  However blockgroup-level data experience an 18 percentage-point increase in 
risk (45%, up from 27%) after assessing for contextual sample uniques.  This is expected given the small 
areal size of blockgroups as well as the relatively large amounts of contextual variation.  For reasons 
provided in Section 3.b., the reidentification of locations should then be minimally affected by the spatial 
mismatch between primary sampling units and county- and tract- level contexts.  On the other hand, 
blockgroup-level contextual data may be better suited to hierarchical designs that pay particular attention 
to drawing nested samples.  While this is an interesting finding, further research using personal identifiers 
is needed to fully assess its implications.   
 
Building upon these modified estimates of “person sample uniques”, I then assess the “needle-in-
haystack” protection offered by large populations falling within county borders, where these results are 
presented in the last two series of Figure A (i.e., solid and striped red bars).  Approximately XX% of my 
survey respondents live in highly populated counties that have rare contextual characteristics.  Assuming 
that the reidentification of these unique geographies poses no real harm to respondents, locational risk 
drops by 45 percentage-point (18%, down from 63%).  But for those living in low-density areas who are 
not offered such protection, 51% of respondents remain in easily reidentified counties.  Consequently, the 
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potential for bias is considerable when contextual information for large fractions of rural populations is 
further altered for confidentiality.  
 
Turning to the bottom panel of the figures, we see how these components of risk ultimately affect dataset 
design.  In contextualizing microdata, producers must choose the scale, number, and coarseness of 
contextual measures and decide whether they will also release identified geography.  Underlying these 
decisions is the potential distortion of contextual information stemming from local suppression or 
perturbation.  If our goal is to construct a dataset that has a minimal level of distortion, what is the 
likelihood of identifying a design that meets this benchmark of utility?  And how does the translation of 
locational risk to individuals – captured by my modified components of risk – ultimately influence the 
chances of meeting this design goal. 
 
To answer these questions, I take estimates of locational risk for my test datasets and identify those 
having less than 5% of respondents with easily-reidentified locations.  I select this benchmark strictly for 
expository purposes since no research has assessed how the analytical utility of contextual data varies 
with aggregate risk.  These test datasets systematically vary in four experimental traits (i.e., scale, 
identified geography, number of contextual keys, and measurement coarseness), representing pertinent 
design elements.  I then calculate the proportion of “promising” datasets who meet this utility criterion, 
estimating the likelihood of identifying designs that require minimal perturbation.   
 
For datafiles containing county-level contexts, the likelihood of identifying a promising design nearly 
quadruples when high-density areas are considered protective (26%, up from 7%).  However the design 
benefits of this assumption do not translate in the production of analytically useful data for rural 
populations, where only 12% of datasets would require a minimal amount of perturbation to ensure 
confidentiality for respondents living in counties with less than 100,000 persons. 
 
For datafiles containing tract-level contexts, approximately one-quarter (23%) are promising in their 
design.  Furthermore, the number of favorable tract-level designs is not reduced by the risk posed by 
sample uniques.  Although this component is negligible for tracts, blockgroup-level data experience a 
jump in aggregate risk from sample uniques.  I expected that such an increase in risk would result in more 
datasets requiring higher rates of perturbation.  But surprisingly, the chance of identifying a promising 
blockgroup-level design is not dampened by this component (16% versus 17%).  Assessing the first 
component of risk, an extreme level of homogeneity within the population of blockgroups was required to 
meet the stringent 5% benchmark.  Consequently, the design elements that produced high match rates in 
the geographic population are the same as those producing large numbers of matches within a sample.   
 
6.  Conclusions4   
In writing this paper, I have two complementary objectives.  My first aim is to develop an analytical 
framework for conducting disclosure analysis of contextualized microdata.  My second aim is to describe 
the intricacies involved in implementing such an analysis.  In doing so, I illustrate the mechanisms that 
translate disclosure risk of geographic units to individual survey respondents (i.e., “locational” risk), 
providing empirical estimates as a way to demonstrate the processes involved and their implications for 
dataset design.   
 
In meeting my first objective, I describe the empirical steps involved in reidentifying geographic units and 
individuals that are represented within a survey dataset.  From this description, I develop a matching 
algorithm that lays the foundation for assessing of disclosure risk of contextualized microdata.  
Hierarchical in nature, this algorithm considers both the individual and contextual characteristics of survey 
respondents as well as their spatial dispersion, whereby five components of risk are formulated and 
brought together in an analytical framework that is recursive.   
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As for my second objective, I implement a modified version of my hierarchical matching algorithm to 
assess three of the five components of risk, that of identifying the location of survey respondents whose 
contextual characteristics: (1) are rarely found among the total population of geographic units; (2) are 
rarely found within a survey; and (3) pose no disclosure risk given the protection offered by the area’s 
dense population.  Expounding upon these components, I discuss the relationships between these 
determinants, the mechanisms that shape each components’ contribution to aggregate risk, and factors 
that should be considered when setting parameters that define locational risk.  Utilizing a synthetic set of 
survey respondents that are thinly dispersed across geographic units, I conduct reidentification 
experiments for a series of test datasets that vary in the scale, variable composition, and measurement 
detail of contextual information.  Gathering metadata from these simulations, I then assess patterns of 
aggregate risk for these three components of locational risk. 
 
Analyses of these metadata provide insight into how the construction of administrative units plays a role in 
disclosure risk.  Counties, tracts, and blockgroups vary dramatically in their areal size, number of units, 
and the heterogeneity in the size and composition of their populations.  These scale factors of geographic 
units influence the translation of location risk to survey respondents through the identification of “personal 
sample uniques” and “needle-in-haystack” protection.  A survey’s sampling methodology also influences 
the reidentification process, particularly as it relates to compilation of respondents within similar contexts.  
 
Most interesting is how different components of risk help intruders pinpoint the location of survey 
respondents and how these sources vary with the spatial scale of contexts.  For instance, my results 
indicate that the risk posed by inadequate numbers of respondents sharing common contexts may be 
considerable when blockgroup-level information is associated with a geographically dispersed sample of 
persons.  Yet the construction of contextualized datafiles may ultimately be unaffected by this component 
of risk since the selection of designs with minimal suppression rates seems to be unconstrained by 
sample uniques.   
 
The current study utilizes a synthetic set of survey respondents derived from a dispersed sampling of 
blocks reflecting the areal distribution of the population.  While this sampling approach is necessary for 
the initial stages of this work, further research needs to be conducted to assess how locational risk varies 
with clustered and hierarchical sampling designs, thereby better reflecting current methodological 
practice.   
 
Furthermore I plan to conduct a full assessment of disclosure risk that brings together a limited set of 
personal identifying variables and my experimental and approximated sets of contextual variables.  Wholly 
implementing my hierarchical matching algorithm under alternative sampling frameworks, a series of re-
identification experiments would consider all five components both individually and additively, assessing 
their relative contributions to disclosure risk.   
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9.  Endnotes  
1 To clarifying terms used throughout this paper, contextual measures are referred to as “key variables” 
being how combinations of their values are used to locate uniques within its target population.  On the 
other hand, geographic identifiers are considered “block variables” being how they are used to subset 
locations within the matching process. 
2 I conduct another set of simulations analyzing contextual measures that are coarsened based on their 
percentile distribution (i.e., percentile recoding).  Twenty percent of all counties have at most 66% of their 
population being non-Hispanic White (i.e., 20th percentile at 66.15%); while thirty percent of all counties 
have at most 76% of their population being non-Hispanic White (i.e., 30th percentile at 76.14%).  
Coarsening the measure into deciles categories, my exemplar county – having 72% of its population 
being non-Hispanic White – would be characterized as falling between 20th and 30th percentiles (i.e., the 
third decile).   
As illustrated in Appendix Table A-3, disclosure risk is heightened considerably by this global recoding 
approach.  Counties having a rare characteristic – those with an outlying value at the tails of a contextual 
variable’s continuous probability distribution – are less likely to be reidentified with percentile coarsening.  
However, counties sharing a relatively common characteristic – those within the middle of the distribution 
– are actually more likely to be reidentified with percentile coarsening.  
Building upon my previous example, let us consider my exemplar county which is one among a population 
of 3,140.  With absolute recoding, this county has approximately 346 matches with values between 70% 
and 80%.  With percentile recoding, there are 315 matches with values between 66.15% and 76.14%.  In 
turn, percentile recoding automatically sets an upper bound to the number of matches, resulting in 
relatively higher risk for more typical counties. 
3 The standard errors for my paper’s point estimates are available from the author upon request.  But 
suffice it to say, all standard errors fall below .03. 
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% Persons, Non-Hispanic White 0.31
% Persons, Non-Hispanic African-American 0.17
% Persons, Non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander 0.07
% Persons, Non-Hispanic Other Race 0.24
% Persons, Hispanic 0.18
% Persons, Foreign-Born 0.17
% Foreign-Born, Naturalized Citizens 0.18
% Households, Linguistically Isolated 0.23
% Persons, In-Poverty 0.19
% Households, With Wage Income 0.18
% Households, Receiving Public Assistance 0.15
% Persons Age 25+, College Degree 0.18
% Families, Female-Headed 0.20
% Persons Age 16-19, Neither Enrolled nor Graduated from High School 0.15
% Housing Units, Owner-Occupied 0.15
% Persons Age 16+, Civilian Labor Force 0.23
% Civilian Labor Force, Unemployed 0.22
Table A-1:  Characteristics of Test Datasets (N=14,796)
Unweighted Averages                                                                                                
Across Datasets
Sampling Total Sample Percent
Synthetic Persons 280,849,847 11,475 0.0041
Geographic-Units
Blocks 8,199,368 11,475 0.14
Blockgroups 208,235 10,401 4.99
Tracts 65,133 8,877 13.63
Counties 3,140 1,784 56.82
States 50 50 100.00
Population Size Average Mininum Maximum
Counties
Geographic Identifiers
None 3,140 3,140 3,140
Population Density 1,047 389 2,294
Division 349 67 618
Division & Population Density 116 15 546
State 63 3 254
State & Population Density 21 0 196
Tracts
Geographic Identifiers
None 65,133 65,133 65,133
Population Density 21,711 13,860 36,070
Division 7,237 3,204 11,346
Division & Population Density 2,412 576 7,456
State 1,303 127 7,049
State & Population Density 434 0 5,838
Blockgroups
Geographic Identifiers
None 208,235 208,235 208,235
Population Density 69,412 47,713 112,251
Division 23,137 11,025 36,768
Division & Population Density 7,712 1,860 23,494
State 4,165 398 22,133
State & Population Density 1,388 0 17,987
Table A-2:  Sampling of Synthetic Persons, Resulting Geographic Contexts, 
and Size of Geographic-Unit Populations
Note: Excludes Washington, DC as well as tracts and blockgroups located in water (i.e., by definition, no populuation 
possible).
Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
Total 0.52 (0.01) 0.39 (0.01) 0.27 (0.00)
Geographic Identifiers
None 0.31 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.16 (0.01)
Population Density 0.37 (0.02) 0.29 (0.02) 0.20 (0.01)
Division 0.46 (0.02) 0.36 (0.02) 0.24 (0.01)
Division & Population Density 0.57 (0.02) 0.42 (0.02) 0.30 (0.01)
State 0.65 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02) 0.33 (0.01)
State & Population Density 0.78 (0.01) 0.56 (0.02) 0.39 (0.00)
Number of Contextual Variables
1-Key 0.19 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00)
2-Keys 0.33 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01)
3-Keys 0.41 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01)
4-Keys 0.49 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01)
5-Keys 0.55 (0.01) 0.42 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01)
Coarseness
1%-Categories 0.99 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00)
5%-Categories 0.77 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 0.44 (0.01)
10%-Categories 0.53 (0.02) 0.36 (0.01) 0.32 (0.01)
15%-Categories 0.39 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
20%-Categories 0.29 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01)
Top-25%, Bottom-25%, Other 0.17 (0.01) 0.04 (0.00) 0.10 (0.01)
Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
Total 0.94 (0.00) 0.75 (0.01) 0.35 (0.00)
Geographic Identifiers
None 0.84 (0.02) 0.56 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02)
Population Density 0.88 (0.01) 0.65 (0.02) 0.30 (0.01)
Division 0.94 (0.01) 0.75 (0.02) 0.34 (0.01)
Division & Population Density 0.97 (0.00) 0.81 (0.02) 0.38 (0.01)
State 0.99 (0.00) 0.86 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01)
State & Population Density 1.00 (0.00) 0.89 (0.01) 0.41 (0.00)
Number of Contextual Variables
1-Key 0.39 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00)
2-Keys 0.69 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01)
3-Keys 0.85 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01) 0.32 (0.01)
4-Keys 0.92 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01) 0.35 (0.01)
5-Keys 0.95 (0.00) 0.79 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01)
Coarseness
1%-Categories 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.33 (0.00)
5%-Categories 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 0.41 (0.00)
10%-Categories 1.00 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) 0.53 (0.01)
15%-Categories 0.99 (0.00) 0.80 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01)
20%-Categories 0.96 (0.00) 0.60 (0.02) 0.45 (0.01)
Top-25%, Bottom-25%, Other 0.68 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01)
Coarseness Based on Absolute Values
Counties Tracts Blockgroups
Coarseness Based on Percentiles
Table A-3:  Aggregate Disclosure Risk of Geographic Units in Test Datasets, By Experimental Traits 
(N=4,932 Datasets At Each Spatial Scale)
Blockgroups
Note:  Assume there is risk of disclosure when there are fewer than 20 matches (i.e., based on reidentification confidence-level 
of p=.05).
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted to account for the complex survey design of sampled variables sets.
Counties Tracts
Weighted Averages                                             
Across Datasets
Proportion At-Risk
Weighted Averages                                             
Across Datasets
Proportion At-Risk
